Friday, 7 September 2007

Plato's Republic and the rule of the wise

Plato's argument is that rule by philosophers is preferable to political equality. In view of the structure of the Republic , should we suppose that Plato offered his account of an ideal polis as a practical proposal, as a utopia, or simply as an example to illustrate a philosophical argument?

Plato's 'Republic' in many ways set the tone for numerous other works that followed it through the ages as the first political utopia. In it, he sets out and describes his ideal state in which an authoritarian form of rule dominates; the rule of the wise. For Plato, only the philosophers have the privileged insight into true knowledge so that a just state must be organised on the basis of those having this knowledge and thus knowing what the good is, ruling. Indeed, he is quite explicit in stating that philosophers are the only people who are fit to rule. Plato sees however, that the setting-up of such a state is far from problematic, with the majority of people seen as being more or less blind to reality and thus unable to appreciate the rule of the few over the many or to know what is really good for them. He does describe ways in which some of the problems associated with this might be at least partly overcome, but some doubts seem to remain as to whether he thinks that the ideal polis is entirely achievable. Running throughout the 'Republic' though, is an undoubtedly strong desire for change and an anxiety to revolutionise the way that human life is organised.
One of the most striking aspects of Plato (in Republic and elsewhere) is the way he deviates from the stances taken by his beloved teacher Socrates, whose dialectic was always one of questioning everything and raising doubt. Plato conversely, developed his doctrine, claiming to have a privileged view of true reality itself, unhidden from the cloaking effects of the superficial world of images which most people accept as the real. For Plato this hidden (to most people) reality, available only to the wise, could be accessed by philosophers by getting beyond the imperfect world of appearance and could be demonstrated through mathematics. The Republic is, though, presented in the form of a dialogue and confusingly gives voice to the character 'Socrates' who we can more accurately take to represent the view of Plato himself and not Socrates. The text could be taken, at least initially as Socretean in nature through the way in which much of the time the dialogue takes the form of questions followed by doubts raised, before answers are found, but the character 'Socrates' spends much of his time answering questions and demonstrating the truth rather than raising doubt at every turn through the lines of thinking. Though Plato honours the memory of Socrates in the dialogue, in many ways he is also abandoning him. Reeve thinks that Plato believed Socrates to have had; '...his philosophical nature "perverted and altered [strephesthai kai alloiousthai]" ' (Reeve, 1988:23-4) by society and suggests that the 'Socrates' in the Republic is true to the essential nature of the real Socrates had he not been 'perverted and altered' by living in the wrong kind of Polis (ibid).
A major assumption that Plato makes is that justice at the level of the individual can be seen as basically equal to that at societal level. Plato begins with the idea of justice in the whole community before scaling it down to individual level. He compares the examination of justice in the state and the individual with trying to read small letters at a distance (analogous to individuals) with reading the same letters, when we find them; written large (analogous to the state) (in Lee, 1987: 57-8):
'....We may therefore find justice on a larger scale in the larger entity, and so easier to recognise. I accordingly propose that we start our enquiry with the community, and then proceed to the individual and see if we can find in the conformation of the smaller entity anything similar to what we have found in the larger.' (ibid: 58).
Plato sees no real problem in equating justice at either level with each-other, though It might well be asked if justice on the individual level really is the same kind of justice as is to be aimed for in a community, though no doubt it might seem easy to criticise him on this point with the benefit of hindsight, and years of sociological enquiry as to those facets of social life that cannot be reduced to individual psychology.
Nevertheless, Plato proceeds to examine justice at societal and individual levels and identifies three main elements of the soul ,which he extrapolates to the three main classes of the ideal state.
One element is characterised as that of 'appetite', that which drives people in their most basic and fundamental desires, such as those of hunger, thirst and '....the agitation's of sex and other desires, the element of irrational appetite - an element closely connected with satisfaction and pleasure' (emphasis added, ibid:156). This element is represented in Plato's ideal state in the order of people who are ruled by appetite above all else and who he calls 'producers'. The producers include the great majority of the population who do most of the ordinary work, with a main incentive being that of satisfying their appetites. For this reason, the producers are allowed private property, an incentive for work.
A second and in a sense higher element of the soul is described as the 'spirit', characterised by the drives of ambition and courage. The class of people who represent the embodiment of spirit for Plato are the auxiliaries or warriors. The auxiliaries undergo extensive programs of education, socialisation and training, for it is they who must carry out the orders of the ruling class in society. In a sense, their description as 'warriors' conceals that part of their function which is more akin, looking at it from our modern perspective, to that of civil servants, in their role of the efficient execution of leader's orders.
The final element of the soul is 'reason'. This is the ultimate element that is used to moderate the other elements. In a wise person, Plato says that the other elements would be balanced by reason, making up a harmoniously well attuned and just individual:
'... by keeping all three in tune, like the notes of a scale (high, middle and low, and any others there be), will in the truest sense set his house to rights, attain self-mastery and order, and live on good terms with himself.' (ibid: 161).
Similarly, for the proper running of a just and ordered state, it would be necessary for the members of that state to take their rightful positions in it, which for Plato corresponds with their class (defined in the terms laid out above, that is; according to the mix of elements that make-up their character). This is necessary because if as Plato insists through 'Republic', the person's soul is a microcosm of the state, then a well balanced state as with a well attuned individual, requires the rule of wisdom and reason over all other attributes. This is the basis of Plato's assertion for rule by philosophers.
For this to work requires people's acceptance of their position in society. Plato deems this to be based on characteristics that are largely pre-ordained and inherited in nature, though there is facility for movement across the classes through the noting (normally by auxiliaries) and selection of people who display appropriate attributes, and their allocation (be it promotion or demotion) to the appropriate class (this would normally be done during member's formative years whilst in their initial education). The producers would be expected to accept their place in the social order on the grounds that the defining and dominant element of their character is 'appetite'. As they are the only class allowed private property and monetary gain, this provides the main motivating factor in satisfying their material desires.
The successful positioning into society of the auxiliaries would be achieved through a long process of education and socialisation, extended to about the age of twenty (Nettleship, 1898: 131). They would undergo various tests and live in spartan conditions so as to have nothing around them that would prevent their becoming successful guardians whilst not being tempted to prey upon other parts of the community, through living a highly disciplined life:
'...it shall be suitable for brave men living under military training and discipline ....They shall eat together in messes and live together like soldiers in camp. They must be told that they have no need of mortal and material gold and silver, because they have in their hearts the heavenly gold and silver given them by the gods as a permanent possession' (in Lee, 1987:125).
Indeed people would be told that their class in society is dependant upon the precise blending of the metals in their souls; that the philosophers would be constituted primarily of gold, the auxiliaries of mainly silver and so on. Even the philosopher-rulers would eventually (after some years) come to believe this 'noble lie' (ibid: 122-4). As well as promoting cohesiveness and allowing people to accept their natural place in social life, the noble lie would encourage fierce defence of the land whenever it were to come under threat if the people believed that;
'...they were fashioned and reared, and their arms and equipment manufactured, in the depths of the earth, and Earth herself, ...they must think of the land in which they live as their mother and protect her if she is attacked, while their fellow citizens they must regard as brothers born of the same mother earth.' (ibid: 122).
The auxiliaries would be trained to treat the other citizens as if partners and friends rather than behave like 'savage tyrants' (ibid: 124), their training compared with the breeding and training of sheep dogs. If a badly reared sheep dog can 'behave more like wolves' (ibid) and worry the sheep, then mis-trained auxiliaries, occupying as they would a pivotal position in society, could cause dissension and society's cohesiveness would be threatened.
Enhanced cohesiveness would also be the effect of the abolition of the private family. It is clear that society in Plato's time was highly patriarchal (see Bosanquet, 1906: 17-21.), and while calls are made in the Republic for equality of women, it is not equality in the form modern feminists would recognise, Plato being only interested in the good of society as a whole, not any particular factions within it. Unanimity is a chief goal and the state is compared with the body in which the part should experience the pleasure and the pain of the whole, the part meaning the individual and the whole body, society; the entire society behaving as one (body) rather than being filtered through smaller and potentially fractious (family) units (Lee, 1987: 190). Dissension, that can so easily start over disputes of private property, Plato claims will also be averted through the inability of men to claim women and/or children as their own (ibid).
Selective breeding would be used to enhance the characteristics of 'stock' (again comparison is used with animal-breeding, this time hunting-dogs and game birds (ibid: 180) ) in each of the classes. This would be done secretly by the manipulation of lottery-based unions between the sexes at organised festivals.
Another important point pertaining to the promotion of stability in 'Republic' is the expressed need for censorship of the arts. Plato thought stories to be very important and that appropriate ones should be used to train the mind at an early age '...before the body is trained ' when '....any impression we choose to make leaves a permanent mark.' (ibid: 72). Inappropriate stories encompassed any that, from Plato's point of view, misrepresented the true (glorious and perfect) nature of the gods and included most of the prominent stories of the time (even the classics of Homer and Hesiod).
All of this paints a picture of Plato's ideal state as a place in which stability, cohesiveness and unanimity are a chief aim. Everyone must accept their largely pre-determined position in life. Society is decidedly totalitarian with all the general and fundamental discussions originating from the top, from the wisest people in it. Little time in the 'Republic' is spent on pondering any possible rebellion from large sections of this perfect state because Plato assumes (at least at the time of writing 'Republic'), that the institutions described above that educate, socialise and order people's lives would maintain stability and allow philosophers' rule to be upheld. Plato believed that it is in everyone's best interest (even the 'lower orders' of society for want of a better definition) to accept the rule of the wisest, though putting such a blatantly undemocratic system into practise (and one greatly at odds with prevailing attitudes in Athens at the time) would have been far more problematic than Plato seemed to anticipate.
What is wrong with democracy, according to Plato, is that a democratic state is not run by philosophers. Only philosophers see the truth and possess knowledge, whereas non-philosphers can only hold opinions based on superficiality. Non-philosophers '.....set their hearts on the field of opinions, not on knowledge '(ibid: 214), they may have an interest in ideas but are '....lost in multiplicity and change ' (ibid: 216). Everywhere around him, Plato saw conformation of what he must have thought of as the inadequacies of democracy, believing politicians' desire for power to be in compensation for their own inadequacies; '....they start fighting for power, and the consequential internal and domestic conflicts ruin both them and society ' (ibid: 264).The expressed need for the rule of the wise is founded on beliefs about access to the truth and beliefs about truth itself. Plato's belief in truth as being a sole understanding of the philosophers is based first of all on the maintenance of the idea of the existence of an ultimate truth in the first place, as opposed to relativism or other opposing stances. His idea that philosophers alone have access to the truth are best and most famously expressed in his parable of the cave, in which only the philosophers, outside in the open, can see reality in full daylight while the ordinary people remain chained deep inside the cave living in continual gloom and seeing only shadowy images. There may be;
'....a certain amount of honour and glory to be won among the prisoners, and prises for keensightedness for those best able to remember the order of sequence among the passing shadows and so best able to divine their future appearances. '(ibid: 258).
For Plato, these passing shadows represent a false sense of reality as experienced by most people, and false ideas about wisdom and the wise are represented by those who revel in finding sequence, order and definition among those shadows, not realising that this is all based on entirely superficial images.
But Plato's cave simile also reveals what may have been his greatest doubt about any possible attempt to put his version of an ideal state into practise. If one of these prisoners were to be forcibly dragged from the cave into the glaring brightness of daylight;
'....the process would be a painful one, to which he would much object, and when he emerged into the light his eyes would be so dazzled by the glare of it that he wouldn't be able to see a single one of the things he was now told were real. ' (ibid).
It seems then that Plato may have had some doubt about the setting-up of his kind of Republic in actuality. If the chances of the blind majority grasping anything of the underlying principles of philosophers' claim-to-rule are remote, then gaining support for such a proposal would seem unlikely, even given institutionalised systems of socialisation discussed above that might enhance the prospect.
Plato's doubts seem further revealed in his change of mood in later writings. In the Laws he again proposes a very authoritarian style of state (in what can again be seen as a rejection of the subversive style of Socrates), but this time he is '....much more ready to compromise with principle in order to find something that will work in practice ' (Honderich, 1995: 686).
Republic is utopian in that it does provide a clearly laid-out blueprint for an ideal society, but it seems that some of its aims might have been in any influence it might have had on more practical points about institutional reform. Given the criticism levelled at the existing institutions and opinions of a very democratically orientated Athens of the day, Republic may be taken to be, at least in part, a hefty critique of established practise. As Richard Nettleship observes; 'The book may be regarded not only as a philosophical work, but as a treatise on social and political reform.' (Nettleship, 1898: 6). Much of Athenian life at the time revolved around both formal, and (private) informal debate. Plato provided an argument (presented very much in the form of an informal, conversational debate of a kind that must have been common at the time) that in some ways went beyond the purely philosophical, to provide food for thought in the contemporary debating arena, in favour of authoritarian control and rule by the wisest in society, rather than democracy.
2729 Words.
Bibliography

Bosanquet, B. (1906), A Companion to Plato's Republic, 2nd ed', London: Rivingtons.

Honderich, T. (ed.) (1995), The Oxford Companion To Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lee, D. (1987), Plato -The Republic, 2nd Ed' (Revised), London: Penguin Classics.

Nettleship, R.L. (1898), Lectures on the Republic Of Plato, London: Macmillan.

Reeve, C.D.C. (1988), Philosopher-Kings, Guildford: Princeton University Press.



Shand, J. (1993), Philosophy and Philosophers, an introduction to western philosophy, London: Penguin Books.

2 comments:

Alison Smith said...

And then I discovered you have this blog too. Interesting. I'll have a read :-)

We haven't had a car for a few years now and how dismayed am I (very) when...I bus/walk along whole roads FULL of car showrooms, or see all the motoring advertisements (yes, even in the Guardian), see cars given away as PRIZES in competitions, grind my teeth when everyone tells me it won't be long before my daughter (she's 3!!) learns to drive, walk past jams of cars with their engines running... :-( oh, I could go on

JT said...

I know! One of the saddest/most depressing things is that all the teenagers I know (I work with young people) still see getting a license/their own car as an absolute essential for their passage into a "free" adulthood.